A Bee is a Fish; an Elephant is not a Human
/If the title of this blog confuses you, welcome to the club! Two recent court decisions have sent us back to high school science class. Let’s take a look.
First, an appellate court in California ruled that four species of bees are legally “fish.” But to get to that conclusion, we first have to set the stage. The California Endangered Species Act directs the Fish and Game Commission to establish a list of endangered species. The Act identifies the species subject to protection as “native species or subspecies of a bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant.” Fish means a wild “fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate, amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals.” Cal. Fish and Game Code, Section 45.
The Commission added four bumblebee species to the endangered list after it was petitioned by several environmental groups. Petitioners (including almond and citrus farmers and the California Farm Bureau, among other groups) appealed the decision. The trial court held that bees are bees, not fish. It reasoned that fish live in the water, which bees do not. The Court of Appeals, however, took a different approach.
In California—unlike many other state courts—the primary goal of construing statutes is to determine the intent of the drafters and effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Many states take a textual approach and focus on applying the language as written.) California courts will interpret “terms of art” in their technical sense. The Court of Appeals looked at the history of the Act and related legislation, including reports provided to the legislature when passing, amending, or changing the Act. The Court concluded the Commission has the authority to list invertebrates as endangered species, and that such invertebrates are not limited to aquatic species since the technical definition of fish includes mollusks, invertebrates, amphibians, and crustaceans, all of which encompass terrestrial and aquatic species. The Court reasoned that “[I]n the end, we do our best to determine the Legislature’s intent when it enacted the Act, while construing the Act liberally, as we must.” There was evidence the legislature had approved of the Commission’s earlier designations of terrestrial mollusks and insects like butterflies as endangered or threatened species. Therefore, the Court concluded, the Commission was within its power when it designated the four bumblebee species as endangered terrestrial invertebrates. These bees are now legally protected as fish. This could lead to pesticide restrictions and other habitat protections.
On the other side of the country, the highest court in New York was pondering whether an elephant is legally a person. Eventually, the court voted 5-2 that Happy the elephant was not a legal person and therefore did not have a right to habeas corpus relief. People file habeas corpus appeals to challenge confinement sentences and protect their bodily integrity. The Nonhuman Rights Group had filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of Happy, seeking to have the elephant released from the zoo. As the Court pointed out, no one disputes that elephants are intelligent animals that should be treated with care and respect. However, “[b]ecause the writ of habeas corpus is intended to protect the liberty right of human beings to be free of unlawful confinement, it has no applicability to Happy, a nonhuman animal who is not a “person” subjected to illegal detention.” According to the New York Times, at the hearing, the Court focused on how autonomy is defined for animals; the meaning of bodily liberty; and the larger effects of a ruling that would move Happy from the zoo.
“While no one disputes the impressive capabilities of elephants, we reject petitioner’s arguments that it is entitled to seek the remedy of habeas corpus on Happy’s behalf. Habeas corpus is a procedural vehicle intended to secure the liberty rights of human beings who are unlawfully restrained, not nonhuman animals.”
So, five members of the Court concluded, Happy was an elephant—not a person—and therefore she did not have rights reserved to people. There were two dissenters. One lengthy dissent pointed out that habeas corpus historically has been used by enslaved people and by women and children—groups of people who were considered “chattel” in our country’s early days. Thus, the dissent continues, there is no reason to limit habeas corpus rights to people. The dissenting opinion contended the court had a duty “to recognize Happy’s right to petition for her liberty not just because she is a wild animal who is not meant to be caged and displayed, but because the rights we confer on others define who we are as a society.” (Judge Rowan D. Wilson.) The other dissent reasoned that:
“history, logic, justice, and our humanity must lead us to recognize that if humans without full rights and responsibilities under the law may invoke the writ to challenge an unjust denial of freedom, so too may any other autonomous being, regardless of species.”
So what have we learned from these two cases? To tell the truth, I’m not sure. The California court focused on the purpose of the statute and technical attributes of the creatures at issue to drive the outcome. The New York court discussed the historical meaning of habeas corpus and the emotional and intellectual abilities of the creature at issue to reach its outcome. Both decisions will have ripple effects beyond the borders of those states.
